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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-APPLICATION OF THE
PARENTAL PREFERENCE RULE-Milam v. Milam, 376
So. 2d 1336 (Miss. 1979).
Steve and Deborah Holcomb Milam were divorced on November
20, 1975. Their child, Shonda Michelle, was born October 9, 1975.1
The divorce decree awarded the permanent care, custody, and control
of the child to her mother and ordered Steve Milam to provide pay-
ments of $75.00 per month for child support.2 Deborah Milam married
Guy Patterson, Jr. on February 28, 1976. Deborah's child from her
previous marriage lived with her mother and Patterson until her moth-
er's death. Deborah Milam Patterson was killed and Shonda was in-
jured in an automobile accident on April 7, 1978. Shortly after the
accident Steve Milam filed a petition to modify the earlier divorce
decree and also prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to
have Shonda placed in his custody.'
Charles Holcomb, a maternal uncle, with whom Shonda had lived
while recovering from the accident, filed an answer and cross-petition
seeking to be appointed guardian ad litem and to have temporary cus-
tody of the child. Guy Patterson, Jr., Shonda's stepfather, also filed an
answer and cross-petition in which he averred that Milam was mental-
ly and morally unfit and that he had abandoned his daughter. Patter-
son sought to be awarded the permanent care, custody and control of
Shonda."
During the trial Milam could prove only one child support pay-
ment. He testified that until Shonda's hospitalization after the accident
he had visited the child only a few times and at no time had he visited
her after her mother's remarriage, just months after the divorce.' He
had never sent her the customary birthday and Christmas gifts, and
the sum total of his visits with Shonda amounted to only about four
hours in length.6 Milam showed that he could financially support the
child and that his grandmother, with whom he lived, would help care
for her.7
Patterson testified that if he was granted custody of Shonda, she
would be with her maternal grandparents during the day and that he
'Milam v. Milam, 376 So. 2d 1336, 1340 (Miss. 1979).
lid. at 1337.
lId.
'Id. During testimony Guy Patterson, Jr. admitted that he and Charles Holcomb had
made an agreement that custody of the child in either one of them would be better than
allowing Milam to have custody. Brief for Appellant at 17, Milam v. Milam, 376 So. 2d
1336 (Miss. 1979).
'376 So. 2d at 1337.
lId. at 1341.
'Id. at 1337.
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would care for her each night. Testimony showed that Patterson and
Shonda had become affectionately attached, manifesting the same re-
lationship that any father and daughter would develop over two and
one-half years.9 Shonda knew Guy Patterson, Jr. as her father and did
not recognize Steve Milam when he visited her in the hospital."
After a full hearing, the chancellor indicated that he felt it was
highly significant that Milam had failed to contribute toward Shonda's
support for over two years. The court refused to accept his excuse that
he was not allowed to see the child and that Deborah had told him
that visitation would cause problems between her new husband and
herself. The lower court also stated in the decree:
I find no fault in Steve Milam presently except for his failure and
refusal to honor his obligation to support his youngster ....
Having for that period of time failed to provide support for the
child, I would have some apprehension about his conduct should ever
adverse situations develop in the future.
At the same time, based upon the performance of Guy Patterson, Jr.
in the past, I have confidence that he will continue to provide for the
needs of this youngster.11
The chancellor then awarded "the exclusive care, custody, and
control" of the child to her stepfather, Guy Patterson, Jr.1"
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed this decree holding that a
natural parent must be granted custody of his child unless by clear
proof it is shown that the natural parent has forfeited the right of cus-
tody by abandonment or immoral conduct. Finding the chancellor had
failed to cite either abandonment or immoral conduct as a basis for his
decision in the custodial hearing, the majority awarded custody of
Shonda Michelle Milam to her natural father, Steve Milam.5
THE PARENTAL PREFERENCE PRESUMPTION
Section 93-13-1 of the Mississippi Code clearly charges the natural
parents with the duty to provide for their children. Likewise it gives
equal rights of custody of a child to the father and mother. The code
also provides that upon death of a parent the remaining parent should
assume all rights and duties. The courts are given statutory authority
'Id. During cross-examination and questioning from the court Patterson admitted that
he had used marijuana, but not within the last seven to nine months. He assured the
chancellor that he would no longer use marijuana or associate with those who used it or
any drugs. Brief for Appellant at 16, 376 So. 2d 1336 (Miss. 1979).
'Brief for Appellee at 5, Milam v. Milam, 376 So. 2d 1336 (Miss. 1979).
111d. at 5-6.
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to interfere with parental guardianship only in the event that a parent
is shown to be unsuitable.1"
Authoritative sources state that in all instances when the custody of
a minor child is involved, the presiding court should seek to preserve
the best interests of the child. In any case involving a natural parent
and a non-parent, the primary presumption of the court is that be-
cause a child's parents love it best, it is for the best interest of the child
that it should be in the custody of its parents.15
The "parental preference" presumption is well established and has
long been followed in the State of Mississippi." All recent child custo-
dy decisions involving a contest between a natural parent and a collat-
eral relative or third person draw their support from the 1900 case of
Hibbette v. Baines,1 which stated:
Because he is the father, the presumption naturally and legally is
that he will love them most, and care for them most wisely. And, as a
consequence of this, it is presumed to be for the real interest of the
child that it should be in the custody of its father, as against collateral
relatives . . ..
This has been the presumption applicable to both the father and
mother and has been followed in a long line of cases including Mi-
lam."
"4MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-1 (1972).
The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their natural chil-
dren and are equally charged with their care, nurture, welfare and education.
The father and mother shall have equal powers and rights, and neither parent
has any right paramount to the right of the other concerning the custody of the
minor or the control of the services or the earnings of such a minor or any
other matter affecting the minor. If either father or mother die or be inca pa-
ble of acting, the guardianship devolves upon the surviving parent. Neither
parent shall forcibly take a child from the guardianship of the parent legally
entitled to its custody. But if any father or mother be unsuitable to discharge
the duties of guardianship, then the court, or chancellor in vacation, may
appoint some suitable person, or having appointed the father or mother, may
remove him or her if it appears that such person is unsuitable, and appoint a
suitable person. (emphasis added).
15J. BUNKLEY, & W. MORSE, BUNKLEY AND MORSE'S AMIS ON DIVORCE AND SEPA-
RATION IN MISSISSIPPI § 8.01 (1957).
"See Moore v. Christian, 56 Miss. 408, 410 (1879) ("Nature gives to parents that right
to the custody of their children which the law merely recognizes and enforces."); Foster
v. Alston, 7 Miss. (6 Howard) 406, 461 (1842) ("the law presuming it to be for its [the
child's] interest to be under the nurture and care of its natural protector, both for main-
tenance and education.") (quoting United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (C.C.D.R.I.
1824) (No. 51,256)).
1778 Miss. 695, 29 So. 80 (1900).
"Id. at 703, 29 So. at 81.
"Kees v. Fallen, 207 So. 2d 92 (Miss. 1968). "This rule has been accepted and is now
firmly established as a part of the case law of Mississippi." Id. at 95. See Turner v.
Turner, 331 So. 2d 903 (Miss. 1976); Simpson v. Rast, 258 So. 2d 233 (Miss. 1972); Pace
v. Barrett, 205 So. 2d 647 (Miss. 1968); Stegall v. Stegall, 151 Miss. 875, 119 So. 802
(1929); Nickle v. Burnett, 122 Miss. 56, 84 So. 138 (1920).
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The parental preference rule is not absolute. Early on, it was con-
templated that in some cases the best interest of the child would not
be served by the child being in the custody of the parent.2" Recogniz-
ing this fact the Hibbette decision held that a showing of abandon-
ment or that the parent was unsuitable would be sufficient to rebut
the presumption.21 Subsequent case law stated that the right of custo-
dy would be forfeited for immoral conduct.' In 1929, the Mississippi
Supreme Court speaking about relinquishment of custody for aban-
donment or immoral conduct, said, "This view of the law is well set-
tled in our jurisprudence."23 It was later established that a parent may
forfeit custody if he is found to be unfit mentally or otherwise.' The
fact that a non-parent has had custody for a long period of time re-
sulting in bonds of affection developing between the child and the
non-parent party in custody, will not rebut the presumption unless
abandonment or unfitness is shown.2" Decisions based upon this prin-
ciple of law indicate a strict adherence to a showing of abandonment
or unfitness. The Mississippi Supreme Court in a 1973 case, reversed
a chancellor's denial of custody to a child's natural mother because
she had moved out-of-state and was about to take the child with her,
which constituted in the chancellor's opinion a material change of cir-
cumstances. On appeal, the supreme court stated this was insufficient
grounds for denying custody to a parent in favor of a third party,
there being no showing of abandonment or unfitness.
The person seeking to deny custody to the natural parent has the
burden of rebutting the presumption of parental preference by a clear
showing of abandonment or unsuitable character.2 However, the
showing need not be so strong as to prove criminal abandonment or
child desertion.s The "character" of proof presented may also be de-
terminative of the ultimate outcome. A mere showing, based on gossip
and hearsay of a mother's unsavory reputation and her indictment for
the murder of her husband, without hard evidence, was held insuffi-
cient to prove moral unfitness.29 The evidence must be of a positive
"See Moore v. Christian, 56 Miss. 408, 410-11 (1879); Foster v. Alston, 7 Miss. (6
Howard) 406, 460 (1842).
278 Miss. at 703, 29 So. at 81.
'Nickle v. Burnett, 122 Miss. 56, 66, 84 So. 138, 140 (1920).
"Stegall v. Stegall, 151 Miss. 875, 879, 119 So. 802, 803 (1929).
"Simpson v. Rast, 258 So. 2d 233, 236 (Miss. 1972); See Turner v. Turner, 331 So. 2d
903 (Miss. 1976); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So. 2d 671 (Miss. 1973).
'Nickle v. Burnett, 122 Miss. 56, 66, 84 So. 138, 140 (1920).
'Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So. 2d 671, 674 (Miss. 1973). See generally Smith, Psycho-
logical Parent v. Biological Parent, 17 J. FAM. L., 545, 548-49 (1979).
'78 Miss. at 703, 29 So. at 81.
'Governale v. Haley, 228 Miss. 271, 281, 87 So. 2d 686, 690 (1956).
'Stegall v. Stegall, 151 Miss. 875, 880-81, 119 So. 802, 803-04 (1929); Accord, Rodgers
v. Rodgers, 274 So. 2d 671 (Miss. 1973) (allegations and circumstantial evidence of im-
moral conduct not sufficient for a showing of moral unfitness).
[Vol. 2:73
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nature. 0
The court has long upheld the natural relationship of parent and
child and any attempt to disturb this institution requires that the court
must be strongly convinced that the parent has forfeited all possible
right to custody. However, on at least two occassions the court has
awarded custody to a non-parent with no showing of abandonment or
mental or moral unfitness.
In the first of these cases, Forbes v. Warren," the mother died in
childbirth and the maternal grandparents took custody of the child.
The father worked for a railroad and traveled, providing virtually no
support for the child. Thirteen years later, after he had married and
purchased a farm, the father initiated a habeas corpus proceeding to
regain custody of his daughter. Although the girl testified that she
preferred to remain with her grandparents, the lower court awarded
custody to her father because no abandonment or unfitness had been
proven. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and granted custody
to the grandparents holding that the wishes of a child of sufficient
capacity should be given consideration. The court ruled that in cases
such as this the child's welfare must prevail over any mere preponder-
ance of legal right to a natural parent.32 A strong dissent argued that
this holding was contrary to the entire Hibbette line of cases.3" Forbes
may be distinguished because the child in question was fourteen years
old and had lived with her grandparents continuously for fourteen
years. The court felt that she was of sufficient capacity to decide with
whom she desired to live,
In Drew v. Drew,4 a father sought custody of his two children who
had remained with his wife after his separation from her. The chan-
cellor found the mother to be morally unfit and would not allow her
to retain custody. Although the chancellor found the father to be a
suitable person and found further that he had not abandoned his chil-
dren, the chancery court awarded custody to a local orphanage. The
decision was based upon a deficiency of evidence supporting the fa-
ther's ability to provide a suitable home for his children. He offered
only uncorroborated testimony that his home for the children would
be with his sister in another state. In affirming this decision the su-
preme court concluded that denial of custody was for the best interest
'Newman v. Sample, 205 So. 2d 650, 652 (Miss. 1968); Hendrix v. Hendrix, 226 Miss.
110, 119, 83 So. 2d 805, 809 (1955).
3184 Miss. 526, 186 So. 325 (1939).
'Id. at 532, 186 So. at 326.
"Id. at 536, 186 So. at 327-28 (Etheridge, J., dissenting). See Turner v. Turner, 331 So.
2d 903 (Miss. 1976); Simpson v. Rast, 258 So. 2d 233 (Miss. 1972); Kees v. Fallen, 207 So.
2d 92 (Miss. 1968); Pace v. Barrett, 205 So. 2d 647 (Miss. 1968); Stegall v. Stegall, 151
Miss. 875, 119 So. 802 (1929); Nickle v. Burnett, 122 Miss. 56, 84 So. 138 (1920); Hib-
bette v. Baines, 78 Miss. 695, 29 So. 80 (1900).
"4249 Miss. 26, 162 So. 2d 652 (1964).
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of the children, but noted that its holding was not a final and com-
plete bar to the rights of the father if he could later show provision of
a suitable home for his children. 5 The Drew holding has been limited
to the facts of the case and did not change the rule concerning a
showing of abandonment or unfitness to deny a parent the custody of
his child in a contest with a third party.36
REQUISITES FOR A SHOWING OF ABANDONMENT
The obvious first impression one receives upon a reading of the
facts of Milam is that the natural father, Steve Milam, had abandoned
his child. For approximately twenty-five months he furnished no sup-
port for her, bestowed upon her no gifts, and virtually never saw her
during her life. The proper inquiry then becomes: Did this constitute
such conduct as has been determined by the Mississippi Supreme
Court to amount to "abandonment"?
One case in which such conduct was found to exist involved a fa-
ther, who had given his fourteen day old son to a friend of his de-
ceased wife. He was found to have abandoned his son, when twelve
years later he sought the boy's return, having never visited him nor
contributed to the child's support. 7 In McAdams v. McFerron,ss a fa-
ther was denied custody after leaving his child with his maternal
grandparents for ten years. The father seldom visited his child, never
showed any special affection for him, contributed nothing to his care
or support, and bestowed no attention on the boy."9 The court defined
abandonment in the McAdams decision.
[W]here a parent, without just cause or excuse, forsakes or deserts
his or her infant child, for such a length of time and under such cir-
cumstances, as to show an intent to shirk or evade the duty, trouble or
expense of rearing it, or a callous indifference to its wants, or a reckless
disregard of its welfare, he or she is guilty of such an abandonment
40
In an adoption proceeding a mother was found to have abandoned
her illegitimate child, having concealed the fact that she was the
child's mother for five and one-half years, having contributed no sup-
port and exhibited little if any interest in the child."1 In another in-
stance, a mother who gave her illegitimate child to a couple at birth
A5d.
"Rogers v. Rogers, 274 So. 2d 671, 674 (Miss. 1973).
'Morgan v. Shelly, 111 Miss. 868, 72 So. 700 (1916).
'180 Miss. 644, 178 So. 333 (1938).
"Id. at 653, 178 So. at 335.
lId. at 654, 178 So. at 335-36 (quoting A. AMIS, THE LAW OF DIVORCE AND SEPA-
RATION IN MISSISSIPPI § 216 (1935)). See, e.g., Governale v. Haley, 228 Miss. 271, 87
So. 2d 686 (1956).
"Wright v. Fitzgibbons, 198 Miss. 471, 21 So. 2d 709 (1945).
[Vol. 2:73
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was adjudged in a habeas corpus proceeding held when the child was
three years old, to have abandoned that child. She had participated in
a fraud to show the receiving couple as the parents on the birth certifi-
cate, showed no interest in the child, provided no support, and made
no move to reclaim the child at one year old when her new husband
sought to gain custody.
42
In a later case the court further defined abandonment as "any con-
duct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to fore-
go all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child
.. .. 43 In Governale v. Haley," a mother gave her child to her sister
when the child was only a few months old. She once expressed a desire
to regain custody of the child, and actually had custody for nearly a
year. Denying the mother custody in a habeas corpus hearing when
the child was ten years old, the court held: "The right of the mother to
the custody of her child, which was paramount in the beginning, has
been compromised by her long acquiescence in a separation that was
brought about by her own voluntary surrender of the custody to her
sister."' 5 One other recorded case since 1956 has denied custody to a
parent because of abandonment." This is apparently due to the further
strengthening of and the complete adherence to the parental prefer-
ence rule by the court. It appears that only in the most glaring cases of
parental abuse and abandonment of duty does the court feel justified
in denying a parent the custody of his or her child, in favor of a non-
parent.
It should be noted that there is a long line of cases in which no
abandonment was found; 4'7 however, only a few need be discussed to
assist in the present analysis. In Pace v. Barrett,48 upon the death of
her ex-husband, the mother filed a petition to modify and amend an
earlier child custody decree which had denied her request for custody.
This petition was denied by the chancellor on the ground that the
mother was not a fit and proper parent because she had previously
abandoned the child. The effect of the findings was to allow custody
to remain with the paternal grandparents. On appeal this decree was
reversed and the mother regained custody. The supreme court ruled
that the earlier decree for modification had not found abandonment as
42Walker v. Williams, 214 Miss. 34, 58 So. 2d 79 (1952).
3Mayfield v. Braund, 217 Miss. 514, 533, 64 So. 2d 713, 721 (1953).
"228 Miss. 271, 87 So. 2d 686 (1956).
4Sld. at 283, 87 So. 2d at 691.
6See Thibodeaux v. Hilliard, 287 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1973).
"Kees v. Fallen, 207 So. 2d 92 (Miss. 1968); Newman v. Sample, 205 So. 2d 650 (Miss.
1968); McWilliams v. Burns, 254 Miss. 326, 180 So. 2d 621 (1965); Hendrix v. Hendrix,
226 Miss. 110, 83 So. 2d 805 (1956); Mayfield v. Braund, 217 Miss. 514, 64 So. 2d 713
(1953); Bullard v. Welch, 171 Miss. 833, 158 So. 791 (1935); Nickle v. Burnett, 122 Miss.
56, 84 So. 138 (1920); Hibbette v. Baines, 78 Miss. 695, 29, So. 80 (1900).
"Pace v. Barrett, 205 So. 2d 647 (Miss. 1968).
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the chancellor had indicated. Since no new testimony was offered in
the hearing for modification to prove that she had abandoned the chil-
dren, the paternal grandparents had no right to custody against the
mother unless abandonment was charged and clearly shown.49
In Simpson v. Rast'0 a father sought the custody of his three chil-
dren from their stepfather after the natural mother died. The natural
parents had been divorced for approximately eight years. Although or-
dered to pay forty dollars per week for child support, he was shown to
have paid less than five hundred dollars over the entire period. The
mother had insisted that he not see the children, but he had in fact,
visited them several times. The chancellor held that it would be better
for the children to remain with their stepfather. On appeal this deci-
sion was reversed as being manifestly erroneous. The supreme court
felt that the father had done nothing "reaching that degree of gravity"
essential to establishing abandonment by the parent.
5 1
On the basis of the above mentioned cases it must be concluded
that the courts are going to be extremely hesitant to find parental
abandonment, unless it is shown that the actions of the parent have
been over such an extended period of time and of such a blatant char-
acter that the best interest of the child can in no way be served by
being in the custody of its natural parent. But if the transgression has
not been ongoing for an extended duration or if it is of such a nature
that it may be forgiven with no harm occuring to the child, the law
will uphold the strong presumption that the best interest of the child
will be served by being in the custody of its natural parent.
BURDEN OF REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION AND OPPORTUNITY TO
SHOW REFORM
In the principal case the chancellor cited as the basis for his decision
Steve Milam's past failure to provide support for his child."2 Without
question in a child custody contest, the law in Mississippi places the
burden on the third party to prove clearly that the biological parent is
mentally or morally unfit or has abandoned the child." A parent does
not have to prove that he has rehabilitated himself unless this initial
burden has been met 4 Because Thompson v. Foster" overruled the
'91d.
"258 So. 2d 233 (Miss. 1972).
111d. at 237.
2376 So. 2d at 1338. "Having for that period of time failed to provide support for the
child, I would have some apprehension about his conduct should ever adverse situations
develop in the future." Id.
'See Turner v. Turner, 331 So. 2d 903 (Miss. 1976); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So. 2d
671 (Miss. 1973); Simpson v. Rast, 258 So. 2d 233 (Miss. 1972).
'205 So. 2d at 649.
'244 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1971).
[Vol. 2:73
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old statement of the law that there could be no opportunity to regain
custody of a child if abandonment had been once proven, the parent is
now given an opportunity to show he has reformed." The court felt
that offering no chance to show reform was too rigid and inflexible a
rule and in truth had not actually been followed. 7
The "no reform" rule was not adhered to in Mayfield v. Braund,s
where the court quoted on the subject of abandonment from a legal
encyclopedia.
It does not follow that the purpose may not be repented of, and, in
proper cases, all parental rights again acquired, . . . but when abandon-
ment is shown to have existed, it becomes a judicial question whether it
really has been terminated, or can be, consistently with the welfare of
the child."
Therefore, even if Steve Milam had, at one time abandoned his child,
his renewed interest upon the death of her mother could be judicially
determined as ending such abandonment, thus reinstating his parental
rights.
Although the supreme court has said that it is not its function to
invade the province of the chancellor in determining what is in the
best interest of the child,60 it has not hesitated to reverse a chancellor's
decision if it represents an incorrect application of law, 61 a manifestly
erroneous finding of fact, or an erroneous application of law to the
facts.62 On one occasion the supreme court reversed a ruling of aban-
donment where the written opinion of the chancellor made no affir-
mative finding of abandonment or unfitness, yet the final decree adju-
dicated both that the father was morally unfit and that he had aban-
61d. at 396. The court in Thompson, overruled the old principle of law stated in
McAdams v. McFerron, that "he or she is guilty of such an abandonment of it [the
child] as to bar his or her right to thereafter reclaim its custody from any person who
may have ministered to and protected it during such period of desertion." 180 Miss. 644,
654, 178 So. 333, 336 (1938) (quoting A. AMIS, THE LAW OF DIVORCE AND SEPARA-
TION IN MISSISSIPPI, § 216 (1935)).
"7180 Miss. at 654, 178 So. at 336.
'217 Miss. 514, 64 So. 2d 713 (1953).
9217 Miss. at 533, 64 So. 2d at 721 (quoting I AM. JUR. Adoption of Children § 42
(1931)).
6 Litton v. Litton, 227 Miss. 569, 578, 86 So. 2d 485, 488 (1956).
61See Turner v. Turner, 331 So. 2d 903 (Miss. 1976); Hale v. Hood, 313 So. 2d 18
(Miss. 1975); Simpson v. Bast, 258 So. 2d 233 (Miss. 1972); Pace v. Barrett, 205 So. 2d
647 (Miss. 1968); Hendrix v. Hendrix, 226 Miss. 110, 83 So. 2d 805 (1955); Mayfield v.
Braund, 217 Miss. 514, 64 So. 2d 713 (1953); Forbes v. Warren, 184 Miss. 526, 186 So.
325 (1939).
"2See Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So. 2d 671 (Miss. 1973); Newman v. Sample, 205 So. 2d
650 (Miss. 1968); McWilliams v. Burns, 254 Miss. 326, 180 So. 2d 621 (1965); Stegall v.
Stegall, 151 Miss. 875, 119 So. 802 (1929).
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doned his children.6" In Simpson v. Rast,"4 the supreme court held that
the decree of the chancery court was "manifestly erroneous," since not
based on a finding that the petitioner was "unfit" to have custody of
his children or that he had "abandoned" them, but rather it was based
on the chancellor's opinion that it would be better for the children to
live with the defendant."s Language such as this used by the supreme
court should be sufficient to place all persons on notice that the court
will not rule against a parent in a child custody case, unless it is spe-
cifically adjudicated that the parent has abandoned his child or is
mentally or morally unfit to have custody.
The dissenting justices in the instant case placed fault on Steve Mi-
lam because he did not seek judicial relief for the alleged prohibition
of his reasonable visitation rights with his daughter and for his unsatis-
factory explanation for his failure to provide support. They felt the
"flimsy pretense" of insuring domestic tranquility between the ex-wife
and her new husband was insignificant.6 This requirement that Milam
justify his past actions would not coincide with the previously noted
burden placed on the third party of clearly showing the fault of the
parent.67 It would also be in direct conflict with the holding that reha-
bilitation must be shown only after a showing of abandonment or
mental or moral unfitness.6 6
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The dissent might have been correct in implying that Milam's re-
newed interest in his daughter may have been based upon the poten-
tial recovery of damages from her accident. 9 However, when later re-
ferring to this probable motive the dissent conceded the significance of
the fact that all three parties sought to become guardian of Shonda's
person and estate.70 This would place all three petitioners on an equal
level in this matter. Therefore this possibility could not work any more
unfavorably against Milam than against the stepfather or uncle. Fault
may also be found in this argument because it is the natural parent's
duty during a child's infancy to administer his affairs, legal as well as
personal. For Milam not to seek an award of damages for Shonda
would be a greater transgression than seeking the recovery which
could then be utilized on behalf of the child.
63217 Miss. at 522, 64 So. 2d at 716.
64258 So. 2d 233 (Miss. 1972).
OId. at 236.
"6376 So. 2d at 1341 (Cofer, J., dissenting).
67See, e.g., Turner v. Turner, 331 So. 2d 903 (Miss. 1976); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So.
2d 671 (Miss. 1973); Simpson v. Rast, 258 So. 2d 233 (Miss. 1972).
"Pace v. Barrett, 205 So. 2d 647 (Miss. 1968).
69376 So. 2d 1341 (Cofer, J., dissenting).
70ld. at 1342-43.
[Vol. 2:73
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The dissent would have placed the custody of the child with her
stepfather, and required the natural father to pay support, but would
have allowed liberal visitation rights hoping that a later material
change in circumstances would warrant placing Shonda in the custody
of her natural father." Justice Cofer, writing for the minority stated in
this regard, that he realized that in cases such as this "reasonable visi-
tation" often must be clarified. 2 A more unmanageable situation could
not be contemplated and could in no way be found to be in the best
interest of the child. Shonda's mother had been tragically taken from
her, now it was urged that she continue living with one "father," visit
with another, and later possibly leave the one with whom she was liv-
ing and go to the home of the other.
In these types of cases the court speaks primarily of the parental
preference rule. Therefore the court must first assume that the child's
interest will be served by being with the natural parent. If this as-
sumption is shown clearly to be in error, then and only then, should
another arrangement be made, but never one that would submit a
child to the inconsistency and uncertainty that would result if the
views of the dissenting opinion were implemented.
The dissent neither makes mention of nor follows the statutory law
of this state." Section 93-13-1 of the Mississippi Code uses strict and
explicit language in proclaiming that if one parent should die, the
guardianship will devolve on the surviving parent. Only if this parent
is proven unsuitable shall another party be appointed as guardian to
the child.7 4 The chancellor found Steve Milam suitable and did not
mention abandonment in his opinion.7" Yet the dissent would interpret
the chancellor's ruling in such a way as to find abandonment,76 and
thus deprive the natural father of the joy of raising his child. A hold-
ing such as this would be clearly inconsistent with the opinion in
Simpson v. Rast" that the chancellor must find abandonment or unfit-
ness.
The ruling in this case need not be limited to cases seeking to modi-
fy a divorce decree. In any contested adoption, habeas corpus, or sec-
tion 93-11-6571 proceeding between a natural parent and any third
"Id. at 1343.
UId. at 1341.
"Compare 376 So. 2d 1340-43 (Cofer, J., dissenting); with MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-
1 (1972).
74Id.
5376 So. 2d at 13.38.
"Id. at 1342 (Cofer, J., dissenting).
77258 So. 2d 233.
""Proceedings may be brought by or against a resident or nonresident of the State of
Mississippi, whether or not having the actual custody of minor children, for the purpose
of judicially determining the legal custody of a child." MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65
(1972).
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party where the issue is the custody of a child, the same assumption as
to parental preference and the same criteria to determine abandon-
ment must be followed.
It is natural that any dispute involving children whether a domestic
quarrel or court proceeding, will necessarily be approached with the
greatest seriousness and weigh heavily upon the courts as well as the
parties involved. Emotions necessarily will become involved in a case
such as this, where a little girl less than five years old may be taken
from the only father that she has known and given to a man who
apparently, in a nonlegal sense, has renounced any right to fatherhood.
These emotions are natural and to be expected.
The court eloquently directed all future jurists on the approach that
must be maintained when this situation arises. Noting the difficulty of
rendering decisions that are totally free from any hardship or injustice
for some of the persons involved in an unusual fact situation, the court
continued: "We are often confronted with the disturbing truth that it
is not within our power to administer equal and exact justice in every
case; that we can administer justice only according to the law. '79 The
court in Milam, assumed the responsibilities as directed by the earlier
courts, took the intent of the applicable statute and the developed law,
and applied them correctly.
James H. Gabriel
"'217 Miss. at 535, 64 So. 2d at 722.
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